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RECENT CASES
data for all types of outside competition may be impossible or im-
practical to obtain.
Since difficulties may arise when total asset, loan and deposit ratios
are used, perhaps a better test may be constructed by utilizing an
inherent requirement of commercial banks-liquidity. Because of the
nature of the liabilities of commercial banks, their loans are, for the
most part, of a short term nature. In addition, this type is subject to
less outside competition. 7 Again utilizing the broad categories pro-
vided by the federal reserve, most of the short term type would
appear to be contained in commercial and industrial loans, loans for
securities, and loans to individuals.18 These three account for over
sixty per cent of total commercial bank loans, and coupled with
competitive-free demand deposits would result in an asset/liability
test, considering both borrower and depositor, that would generally
yield a more accurate measurement of competition between inherent
functions of commercial banks. This in turn would provide a much
more realistic picture of concentration among commercial banks.
Although this test would not lead to ratios with the high degree of
consistency now enjoyed, it would appear reasonable to expect some
type of correlation between the loan and deposit sectors because of
the similarity in the degree of liquidity. Even with this drawback,
this test, in the majority of cases, would appear more likely to test
competition among commercial banks, which, after all, is the essence
of the problem.
Stephen H. Johnson
CoNsUTONAL LAw-PoLucE PowER-A.Esmnc NUISANCE.-Appel-
lants challenged the constitutionality of the Billboard Act.' With
minor exceptions, the act prohibits the erection of any "advertising
device" within 660 feet of the right-of-way of any interstate highway,
limited access highway, or turnpike. Held: The act is a constitutional
exercise of the state police power. Moore v. Ward, 877 S.W.2d 881
(Ky. 1964).
Appellants contended there was a procedural error in the refusal
of the circuit court to admit evidence indicating no relationship exists
17 Steiner, op. cit. supra note 7, at 139-43.
1 Ibid., 50 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1558 (1964).
1Ky. Rev. Stat. 177.830-.990 (1960) [hereinafter cited as KES].
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between outdoor advertising and traffic safety,2 the purpose of such
evidence being to impeach the judgment of the legislature and,
ultimately to show the arbitrariness of the act as a safety regulation.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion and said:
In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute the court takes judicial
notice of matters of common knowledge. . . . The court may not
examine the validity of reasons which impelled the legislature to act,
nor may it reappraise those reasons.3
The court cited Kohler v. Benckart4 which relied on 11 American Juris-
prudence "Constitutional Law" section 145 (1937). The court also
cited the American Jurisprudence section.
The grounds given for excluding evidence so vital to appellants'
case are open to skepticism. In Kohier v. Benckart, the court merely
stated the general rule that many courts do "not consider evidence
aliunde to show the invalidity of a statute."5 American Jurisprudence
severely qualifies and limits the rule in the section cited 6 and many
exceptions exist.7
Indeed, the Kentucky law is that the means adopted by the legisla-
ture in the exercise of its police power must have more than an
"ascertainable" relevancy to the object; the relevancy must be "sub-
stantial."8 It would seem this higher standard carries with it a cor-
relative duty to scrutinize contested legislation to determine its funda-
mental purposes. In Tolliver v. Blizzard,9 the court was explicit in
holding that although the state may impose regulations through its
police power:
The individual may pursue without let or hindrance from any one, all
such callings or pursuits as are innocent in themselves and not injurious
2 Several studies have been made on this question. See, e.g., Price, Billboard
Regulation Along the Interstate Highway System, 8 Kan. L. Rev. 81, 88 (1959).
In commenting on these studies, Judge Davison, in Ghaster Pro erties, Inc. v.
Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio 1962), concluded: "If any such relation is shown
at all, it is to the effect that such devices are beneficial to safety in that they tend
to alert drivers, to keep them actively attentive to roadway conditions and tend
to prevent 'highway hypnosis."'
Moore v. Ward, 877 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1964).
4252 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1952).
5 Id. at 856.
6 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 145 (1937). It is further limited in 39
Am. Jur. Nuisances § 13 (1942).
7See Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Bowman v. Virginia
State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S.E. 141 (1920); Barker v. State Fish
Comm'n, 88 Wash. 73, 152 P. 537 (1915).
8 City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 301 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1957);
Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky.
689, 211 S.W.2d 867 (1948).
0 143 Ky. 773, 137 S.W. 509 (1911).
[Vol. 53,
RECENT CASES
to the public. These are fiudamental rights of every citizen living
under this government.' 0
In view of the obvious due process isue in the principle case, it is
doubtful such evidence should have been excluded. Where a specific
constitutional prohibition is involved to require a state to refute
evidence that its safety statute does not, in fact, promote safety is not
an unreasonable burden.1
It was further contended by the appellant property owners that
even granting some public interest is promoted by the act as a safety
regulation, the interest is so slight and nebulous, in comparison with
the rights restricted, as to brand the legislation unreasonable.'2 The
court answered with the argument that since the property interests
impaired have value only in the exploitation of a public highway, that
therefore the public property rights in the highway may impose a
servitude upon them, i.e., to the point of abolishing them in places
deemed necessary by the legislature. 13
The argument is particularly weak. Taken in the broad sweep
proclaimed in the Moore case, any person, who, by improving his
own property, also causes an appreciation in the value of surrounding
properties, has the right to charge for, or restrict the use of, all
improvements. Surely it is false logic that a mere proximity to
other buildings and establishments, public or private, entitles the
entity causing the proximity to capture for itself a resulting increase
in property values. By the same token, neither should such a situation
entitle the one creating the improvements to prohibit surrounding
owvners from enjoying and profiting by their new locale.14 This is
artificial reasoning. It is a "dog-in-the-manger" argument.
The weakness of the opinion is particularly regrettable in light of
the fine precedent available in Jasper v. Commonwealth5 of which the
court so sparingly availed itself. The opinion scatters its shot in an
inconsequential pattern when it suggests that where the constitu-
tionality of a statute involves many intangible factors, it is not within
10 Ibid. For a vivid illustration of the superiority of constitutional rights even
where the demand for social improvements is very great, see Justice Holmes'
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).11 The United States Supreme Court has consistently given a narrower scope
for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to violate a specific prohibition of the Constitution. Ex parte Ende,
:323 U.S. 283 (1944); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
12 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Ky. 1964).
13Ibid.
14 Chaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552, 560 ( ).
15 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964). The case held constitutional the act requiring
screening of junk yards (KRS 177.905-.990 (1962)).
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the province of the court to hold the statute invalid by reaching a
conclusion contrary to that of the legislature.16 The "intangible factors"
of which the court speaks can easily be combined to two very tangible
ones; safety and convenience in interstate travel, and preservation of
the natural scenic beauty.
Apparently, in spite of its holding in the Jasper case, the court is
still reluctant to affirm a clear stand in favor of aesthetic zoning when
the opinion can be based on other grounds. Presumably, this is be-
cause a legislative power to declare a thing a nuisance for purely
aesthetic reasons is pregnant with possibilities for abuse.17 One judge
commented that:
Authorities in general agree as to the essentials of a public health pro-
gram, while the public view as to what is necessary for aesthetic progress
varies. Certain legislatures might consider that it was more important to
cultivate a taste for jazz than for Rembrandt, and limericks than for
Keats. . . . The world would be in a continual seesaw if aesthetic con-
siderations were permitted to govern the use of police power.18
It is because of these historical betes noires that the courts have
strained for years to sustain regulatory or prohibitory ordinances on
traffic safety.19 Although, in most instances contorted reasoning seems
to have produced the right results, it is time the courts squarely faced
the issue and sustained the legislation solely on aesthetic grounds.
With the greatly enhanced importance of the tourist dollar to state
welfare,20 coupled with the natural depletion of the scenic resources
via urbanization and industrialization, the long tradition of near
absolute sanction to clutter one's property with commercial advertis-
ing passed the bounds of unlicensed freedom. The tort of aesthetic
nuisance can now stand alone.21 The make-weight arguments of
traffic safety and wrongful exploitation of the public highway by
private property interests in the Moore case do not do justice to the
court.
John Lackey
16 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Ky. 1964).
17 Cochran, Esthetic Zoning-The Trend of the Law, 7 W. Res. L. Rev. 171,
179 (1956).
I8 Youngstown v. Kahn Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661-62, 148 N.E. 842,
844 (1925).
19 156 A.L.R. 586 (1945).
20 See Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762, 764 (1961).
21 Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauph Co. Rep. 91 (Pa. 1942), 156 A.L.R.
